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Introduction 
Regulations in the food and agriculture sectors abound. In many cases they are put in place 
and enforced by governments in order to address societal interests where unregulated markets 
are not yielding the desired outcome. In some other cases these measures may be motivated 
by protectionism or outdated science. Nevertheless, external effects and information 
asymmetries abound and require intervention, and this paper focuses on those cases.  
Many of the regulations address human health issues; others address environmental 
and animal welfare problems associated with agricultural production. As long as the 
regulation concerns a non-tradable good (or service) the optimal design of the regulatory 
measures need not take the interest of foreign parties into account. However, when the 
product is tradable across national borders, border measures and behind-the border measures 
are usually taken to assure that the imported varieties meet domestic requirements. Hence, 
trade flows may be affected by these regulations. Research on non-tariff measures (NTMs)1 
looks at regulations other than tariffs having an impact on international trade. 
With increased international integration in the context of lower tariffs and less 
stringent quotas, trade is becoming a major potential vector of external effects. Imports can 
carry invasive species such as pathogens, pests, or weeds, foreign to an economy’s ecology. 
Furthermore, different trade partners may have different food safety standards and 
institutional capacity to enforce them. This may lead to imports of agri-food products that do 
not meet domestic requirements. Imperfect and incomplete monitoring of imports at the 
border compounds the health or environmental risk (Gossner et al., 2009). In countries with 
ill-defined property rights, trade may also encourage unsustainable production of some goods 
 
1 “NTMs are policy measures, other than ordinary customs tariffs, that can potentially have an economic effect 
on international trade in goods, changing quantities traded, or prices or both” (MAST, 2008). This definition is 
too broad to be informative. Here, we further narrow down the definition focusing on the group of measures that 
indirectly affect price and/or quantity by altering attributes of the goods being sold and their perception by 
consumers, typically through regulatory measures. We focus on MAST’s categories A (technical barriers to 
trade), B (sanitary and phytosanitary measures), and C (other technical measures). 
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for the export market, leading to a deterioration concerning global-commons issues 
(Chichilnisky, 1994). Governments invoke these issues to apply a wide array of NTMs to 
address real and perceived domestic concerns.  
In a few instances, trade is the direct conduit of significant external effects and it may 
be an option to directly restrict trade. Often many policies tend to be more effective at 
addressing external effects than others such as blunt trade barriers. Assessing the economic 
effects of NTMs poses significant challenges as the link between trade, welfare, and policy is 
tenuous. Many NTMs may restrict trade but can improve welfare in the presence of negative 
externalities or informational asymmetries. Other measures can expand trade as they enhance 
demand for a good through better information about the good or by enhancing the good’s 
characteristics (Maertens et al., 2007; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009).  
Efficiency costs of NTMs are hence much less evident than the welfare losses 
associated with tariffs and quantity measures. They do not necessarily embody the economic 
inefficiencies that are associated with classical trade barriers, unless they discriminate 
between sources of supply; they may or not be the least trade-restrictive policies available to 
correct market imperfections and least trade restrictive policies may fail to maximize welfare 
inclusive of the externality. It is therefore not clear a priori that the trade impacts of the 
concerned regulations are inefficient, or that removal of associated NTMs that affect trade 
would achieve efficiency gains relative to the welfare level under existing regulation.  
Beyond the type of instrument, the level of intervention is also important in the design 
of NTMs, such as an optimum maximum residue level or inspection level. In the presence of 
disease risks, well designed NTMs may allow for some limited amount of trade, while in the 
absence of measures, such as strict border inspections or restricting imports to products from 
a specific country or region within a country, no trade will take place at all (Paarlbergh and 
Lee, 1998; Wilson and Anton, 2006; Pendell et al., 2007 among others). These features of 
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NTMs and market imperfections are not well recognized in much of the existing literature, 
which tends to have a narrow mercantilist focus on foregone trade and trade cost (e.g., Kee et 
al., 2009). These trade effects have been extensively analyzed with the gravity-equation 
approach. Many gravity analyses tend to be broad in scope (multi commodity/sector, 
countries, and policies), which allows for a broad-brush investigation of general hypotheses 
such as the trade-restricting or expanding effects of NTMs or the impact of harmonization. 
The gravity equation has also been used to look at specific policy issues such as the European 
Union (EU) aflatoxin policy (Otsuki et al., 2001). Beyond the well-established trade 
impeding effects of many NTMs, trade expanding effects also have been identified, often 
through harmonization and shared standards, in customs unions, and for some goods and 
policies (Moenius, 1999, 2006; Fontagné et al., 2005; Henry de Frahan and Vancauteren, 
2006; and Disdier et al., 2008). A few studies found an absence of trade effects from NTMs 
in some sectors (Fontagné et al., 2005) and for harmonized measures (Czubala et al., 2009). 
Effects of NTMs have also been studied with partial and general equilibrium simulation 
models, usually by parameterizing them as tariff-equivalent in the import demand (or export 
supply) functions.2 Consumer valuation of external effects has been neglected in most of 
these analyses. The WTO itself tends to focus on effects on trade and producer welfare rather 
than on effects on consumer welfare, a shortcoming from an economic perspective. Our paper 
fills that void with a systematic approach to consumer valuation in the economic analysis of 
NTMs.  
The paper develops a unified analytical framework to assess the costs and benefits of 
NTMs for market stakeholders: domestic consumers, various producers involved in the 
supply chain, and governments, as well as foreign suppliers, and wherever relevant, foreign 
consumers and governments. Trade effects are part of the assessment, as NTMs have an 
 
2 See Korinek et al. (2008) for a review of quantitative approaches. 
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impact on trade as conduit of the externality, but trade effects are not the sole focus. The 
analytical framework allows comparison of alternative ways to design measures. It discerns 
their trade and welfare effects. For example, an import ban (or prohibitive standard) to keep 
the domestic market free of some undesired product characteristic can be compared to 
allowing trade under clear identification of the foreign product (e.g. through labeling).  
An important dimension of the framework is its ability to distinguish those consumers 
(or producers) that are concerned by the negative or positive externality and product 
attributes, from those that are not concerned. Concerned consumers put a value to avoiding 
(consuming) the negative (positive) product characteristic. This valuation is a key variable in 
the cost-benefit assessment of measures that address failures affecting consumers. Estimating 
this value empirically is a challenge, but recent advances in consumer economics are 
promising. On the production side, the value of avoiding a failure is directly related to the 
value of the production loss that can occur if the failure remains unabated. 
We illustrate the approach with an application to shrimp trade and the consumer 
valuation of information pertaining to food safety characteristics related to antibiotics in 
shrimps elicited in economic experiments. The cost-benefit framework is essentially a 
modular partial equilibrium model, with demand and supply relationships, that can be 
calibrated to empirical data and allowing the calculation of economic welfare effects. The 
modular set-up renders the approach flexible enough to expand it with side calculations. For 
example, detailed estimates of costs associated with monitoring and enforcement of measures 
could easily be added, but are not currently elaborated in this paper.  
The welfare-based approach can be used to define optimal non-tariff trade policies. 
The optimal NTM could well be different from the international standard implied by the 
sanitary and phytosanitary or technical barriers to trade agreements. The welfare-based NTM 
could recommend policy stringency exceeding an international standard. The framework is 
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also useful for sorting out least-trade restrictive interventions among NTMs considered by 
policy makers and the potential trade-offs (or lack thereof) between welfare and trade. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the main types of market 
failures and associated NTM policy instruments. Section 3 presents a modular framework to 
assess costs and benefits linked to NTMs. Section 4 illustrates the approach with an 
application to shrimp trade and NTMs using recent findings in consumer valuation. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Market imperfections 
Abstracting from outright protectionism, regulations are designed to address market failures 
and imperfections. This section discusses major forms of market imperfections and failures 
which are relevant for NTMs. We consider three different types: 1) those affecting 
consumers; 2) those affecting producers; and 3) global commons issues, usually related to the 
conservation of valuable eco-systems.  
Many NTMs attempt to remedy external effects. Externalities occur when some 
agent’s utility or production depends on the choices made by other agents, who do not factor 
these external effects into their decision making. As a consequence, there are costs, or 
benefits, associated with the externality that fall on some agent but are not reflected in market 
valuations. It is useful to characterize an externality by its point of impact in order to organize 
the discussion. When the external cost or benefit arises in consumption it will be referred to 
as a consumption externality, and similarly for production externalities. As an example, 
consider harmful chemical residues that arise in production of some food products for which 
their possible health impact occurs on the consumption side; this type of externality will be 
referred to as a consumption externality.  
Other market imperfections addressed through NTMs relate to the consequences of 
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asymmetric information (one partner in a transaction knows more than the other) or imperfect 
information (not all consequences can be known). These informational problems can also 
occur on either the consumer or producer side. They can also play a role in the context of 
monitoring of rules and regulation by governments. Finally, some failures are global in the 
sense of a global-commons problem for a resource perceived as belonging to the (global) 
community and requiring collective stewardship. There is a trans-boundary element in the 
market failure.  
Externalities affecting consumers 
This case involves the creation of a negative externality on agents not associated with 
production or consumption of the good. Consumers are affected by the external effect which 
is independent from their own consumption basket. If a good releases pollution during either 
its production or its consumption it may affect other persons who are not at all involved in 
producing or consuming that good. Consumers’ concern about animal welfare is an example. 
Here some consumers (or rather ‘citizens’) are concerned about production methods; their 
welfare is affected regardless of their own decisions to consume or not meat coming from 
animals produced under certain conditions deemed inhuman.3 Consumers could be further 
disaggregated into consumers in the importing country and those in the exporting country as 
they may be affected differently. 
Asymmetric information on health, safety, or nutritional value  
This type of imperfection is associated with the purchase or the consumption of the good by a 
final consumer. The consumer derives a benefit from consuming the good but also bears a 
cost or benefit not exactly known to him via a health impact. Hence, the perceived and true 
social costs of the good differ. If the consumer is ill-informed about the characteristics of the 
 
3 This case corresponds to damages from the externality that are “separable” from market consumption 
decisions. The externality affects the representative consumer’s welfare but not directly through her market 
consumption decision. By convention economics treats citizens as consumers whenever citizens are not 
producers. 
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good, a situation of asymmetric information prevails. Some attributes, either experience or 
credence attributes, are unknown or uncertain to the consumer at the time of purchase and 
may decrease (as in the case of deleterious ingredients) or increase (as in the case of 
nutritional benefits) the value of the good. There are also attributes that are unsafe to 
consume and could harm consumers. Recent examples of asymmetric information associated 
with an undervaluation of health risks are outbreaks of E-coli and salmonella, presence of 
chemical residues such as melamine residues, unknown to some consumers, in either the 
importing or the exporting country.  
Externalities impacting producers 
External effects arise when the production process of a good is altered by external forces 
other than prices. Water pollution may impact fishery production, for example. The pollution 
is generated either by consumption, production, or trade elsewhere or by the ecological 
environment itself as in the case of soybean rust brought to the United States by hurricanes. 
The resulting impact is a decrease in production, because of an increase in the cost of 
production either by loss of efficiency (farm yields fall) or by trying to abate the external 
effects (fungicide applications to eliminate some fungus). These occurrences may be non-
rival (a whole region is hit by a food and mouth disease outbreak) or private (a single 
livestock producer hit by contamination of feed).  
Asymmetric information in production  
Producers, like consumers, may also suffer from asymmetric information and purchase inputs 
with unsafe attributes (e.g., a seed-borne disease could lower profits).  
Global common issues 
Global commons or common-pool resources refer to resources perceived as belonging to the 
(global) community and requiring collective stewardship. They are open access resources, for 
which property rights are not well defined or not defined at all. Examples of such global 
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commons problems include unsustainable resource use in forest products, depletion of fish 
stocks through over-fishing, and agricultural production with negative impacts on 
biodiversity. Consumers do not need to consume a specific good themselves to suffer the 
externality. However, consumers may derive benefits from consuming products certified as 
respecting the commons. Eco-labels and fair trade are well known examples of measures 
providing perceived benefits to consumers with global-commons concerns.  
Although the analytical treatment of global commons cases will often be closely 
related to the treatment of externalities affecting consumers, it is worth distinguishing the 
former as an increasing number of trade frictions between high-income and low-income 
economies are based on global commons issues and as interest in sustainable practices 
expands. Trade is often central: a good is imported from a source characterized by global- 
commons issues or unsustainable practices. A NTM in the importing country may attempt to 
alleviate the global-commons problem in the sourcing country.  
Imperfect monitoring and other government failures 
In practice, the implementation of existing regulatory policies can only be imperfectly 
monitored and incompletely enforced. In this sense governments are failing by not doing 
enough, i.e., a failure by omission. The limited institutional capacity to monitor and enforce 
regulations sometimes calls for additional interventions, or may necessitate policies that 
would not be welfare-optimal if monitoring were perfect. Mitigating the institutional 
deficiencies can have strong trade implications and bring costly policies. A failure to detect 
and contain food and mouth disease or bovine spongiform encephalopathy early can induce a 
collapse of trade if partners are closing borders as an emergency measure. If institutional 
capacity for border inspection is limited, a country might chose to designate just one port of 
entry for imports of certain food products, and this measure can lead to an additional trade 
cost. Other policy responses may be more cooperative when they can be planned, especially 
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in the North-South context. For example, coordination of policies such as certification of 
South exporters by importing countries in the North providing the additional capacity missing 
in the exporting country (e.g. the EU assisting Latin American meat packers to meet EU food 
sanitary and phytosanitary standards). 
All these market imperfections can be addressed through a wide range of policies, but 
this paper concentrates on those policies that have a potential impact on international trade 
flows, singling out NTMs.  
 
3. Cost-benefit framework: a modular approach 
This section presents a simplified framework that allows the assessment of economic effects 
of NTMs designed to address different types of market failures and market imperfections 
mentioned above. The framework is particularly tailored to our empirical application 
presented in section 4. On the consumer side, the approach rests on insights from modern 
empirical consumer economics and on the producer side it incorporates insights from 
epidemiological studies. 
The framework is modular, essentially a partial equilibrium model. New elements 
with detailed side calculations can be attached or removed from the main structure without 
the necessity to alter the general logic of the approach. The theoretical framework is designed 
to be applied with empirical data to facilitate a quantitative cost-benefit analysis. Not each 
and every potential effect is discussed here, as the framework may be easily extended in 
many directions to analyze particular trade problems. One element not elaborated here, but 
which can be important in practice, concerns costs related to administration, monitoring, and 
enforcement.  
The framework comprises “modules” for calculation of costs and benefits affecting 
(a) domestic consumers, (b) domestic producers, (c) domestic government, and (d) foreign 
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producers. For simplicity, foreign consumers and governments are not included here. In 
addition, the different actors in the supply chain (farmers, processors, retailers etc.) are 
collapsed into a single production stage representing supply. These abstractions influence 
results in many cases but are maintained here to preserve clarity in exposition. The exposition 
introduces a minimum of technical detail. Because of a lack of space, we only focus on 
market failures affecting consumers.4 The market good being analyzed here is assumed to be 
homogenous and presents a specific characteristic. 
We assume that, without regulation, producers offer a good with a specific 
characteristic (an environmental or safety risk or a specific process of production) that 
domestic consumers do not want. The regulation therefore protects domestic consumers 
regarding the specific characteristic conveyed by products.  
We focus on a regulation corresponding to a safety standard5 that fully eliminates the 
characteristic such as a ban on some antibiotics eliminating antibiotic residues in food. For 
food safety, the standard is the most likely instrument compared to a voluntary label signaling 
higher level of safety than the level offered by regular products (see van Tongeren et al., 
2009 for a case with a label). The model discussed below assumes that foreign and domestic 
producers have different technologies for food safety, which means they are not similarly 
impacted by the enforcement of a standard (for heterogeneous producers also see Marette and 
Beghin, 2010). In the baseline, the domestic firms are assumed to have implemented the 
standard, so that additional compliance costs fall only on foreign firms. However, the 
analytical simplification maintained here allows a sharper focus on the implications of 
regulatory heterogeneity between countries, reflecting differences in what is considered 
                                          
4 Production-based failures, such as animal or plant disease outbreaks, can also be conceptualized as a negative 
shock on supply, inducing a shift or a pivot of the marginal cost curve (see Orden and Romano, 1996; Wilson 
and Anton, 2006; Peterson and Orden, 2008). 
5 The term ‘standard’ is used here to denote mandatory product and process requirements imposed by 
governments. The trade literature often reserves this term to private voluntary arrangements, while it uses the 
term ‘regulation’ to refer to government policies.  
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appropriate product characteristics. This assumption is particularly valid for the application to 
shrimp trade which is elaborated later.  
Supply side 
A perfectly competitive industry with price taking firms is assumed for both domestic and 
foreign supplies. We abstract from the export or re-export from the domestic country, 
implying that imports and domestic production are only purchased by domestic consumers. 
  There are MO domestic firms and MF foreign firms. Firms’ cost functions are 
quadratic in output, and they are choosing output to maximize profits:  
 212sj sj s sj s sjpq f q c qπ = − −    for j={1,…,Ms}; s={O, F},                                      (1) 
where ,s sc f  are the variable cost parameter.
6 Profit maximization yields individual firm 
supply functions which can be added up to yield industry supply Q.7 The firms’ inverse 
supplies are expressed as   
                                                                         (2) 
( ) /       
( ) / +  .       
S
O O O O O O
S
F F F F F F
p Q c Q M f
p Q c Q M f
= +
=
The total inverse supply defined by the sum of foreign and domestic supply is 
               ( ) .      S O F O F O O FO F O
O F F O
c c Q f c f cp Q
c M c M+
+ += +                                              (3) 
For the rest of the analysis we assume that  and >Oc cF FOf f> ; domestic producers 
incur higher marginal cost than foreign producers. This reflects a situation where domestic 
production incurs a costly effort to eliminate the specific characteristic (an 
environmental/safety risk or a specific process of production) that some domestic consumers 
                                                             
6  We could also extend the analysis with a sunk cost sK  linked to the firm’s market entry and compliance with 
regulations. 
7 Individual supply functions are only defined for prices exceeding average costs, because otherwise firms 
would obviously cease production.  
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do not want, while foreign producers do not eliminate the characteristic and do have to bear 
these additional costs.8   
If the safety standard is imposed, the inverse supply of foreign producer can be 
represented as a multiple of the original supply: ( )( ) /SF F F F F Fp Q c Q M fλ= +  with 1λ > . 
Recall that only foreign producers are impacted by the adoption or the reinforcement of the 
safety standard via a variable cost increase; domestic producers are not impacted since they 
already offer food products without the specific characteristic. From some empirical 
parameterization of the model, it is possible to know the relative change γ   in the inverse 
supply curve, namely the price increase per unit relative to the supply linked to the baseline 
scenario. Thus the relative change in the supply curve at the equilibrium is defined by 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) 1/ −=−= λγ
F
S
FF
S
FF
S
F QpQpQp . Thus the parameter of the supply ( )
S
F Fp Q  after the 
standard implementation is equal to 1λ γ= +  .  
Demand side 
The characterization of preferences largely follows Polinsky and Rogerson (1983). For 
simplification purposes all consumers are concerned. Consumers unanimously prefer safe 
food. Demands are derived from quadratic preferences. Demand of each consumer 
i={1,…,N} in the importing country is derived from a quasi-linear utility function that 
consists of the quadratic preference for the market good of interest and an additive numéraire: 
         2( , ) / 2 (1 ) ( )i i i i i i F i iU q w aq bq I S r Q Q q w= − − − +       (4) 
where the term 2 / 2i iaq bq−  is the immediate satisfaction of consumer i from consuming a 
quantity  of the good and  is the numéraire good consumed by i. For simplicity iq iw ,a b  are 
the sam rs. The consumer cannot distinguish the two goods (foreign e for the N consume
                                                             
8 Measuring cost of regulatory compliance for firms is far from straightforward. Various methods have been 
used: firm-level surveys (e.g. Wilson and Otsuki, 2004), price comparisons (Ferrantino, 2006; Yue et al., 2006), 
cost accounting (e.g. Grothe et al., 2000), econometric estimations (Antle, 2000; Maskus et al., 2005).  
 14 
 
versus domestic). 
The binary variable S indicates the safety standard policy. Under the absence of 
standard with S=0, the per-unit damage  is linked to the foreign product purchased by the 
consumer. Only a fraction
ir
( FQ Q) O, with FQ Q Q= + , of the good on the market has the 
specific characteristic. The perceived damage associated with the consumption of the good 
with the specific characteristic is denoted ( )i F ir Q Q q .  
The effects of information are captured by the term (i i F )Ir q Q Q− . The binary 
parameter I represents the knowledge regarding the specific characteristic brought by the 
good. If consumers are unaware of the specific characteristic or if there is an unaccounted 
externality linked to the specific characteristic, then I=0. Conversely, I=1 means that 
consumers are aware of the specific characteristic and internalize the externality and reduce 
their consumption. Creating this awareness can be part of food safety policy packages.  
 For the rest of the analysis, we consider both situations (I=0 and I=1). First with I=0, 
the non-internalized damage should be accounted for in the welfare calculations, but does not 
feedback in the demand. Second with I=1, consumers internalize the damage and demand is 
reduced. When the safety standard is implemented (S=1), the damage completely disappears, 
which makes both alternative situations of consumer awareness (I=0 and I=1) equivalent. 
   The maximization of the utility function under a budget constraint yields a demand 
function for each consumer. Aggregate demand for the good is obtained by summing 
individual demand functions over all N consumers. The associated damage per unit consumed 
is equal to r ( FQ Q)  for the N consumers. With /b b N= , the overall (inverse) demand 
function for all consumers is ( , , ) (1 ) ( )Fp Q I r a bQ I S r Q Q= − − − .  
 Parameterization of r is crucial to the empirical assessment. Survey and lab 
experiment providing information on consumer willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a good can be 
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used here. More precisely, r is defined with the relative change in the average consumer 
WTP. The value of the relative change is computed as follows: 
[ ( ) ( )] / ( )Info NoInfo NoInfoE WTP E WTP E WTPδ = −
[ (p Q
 by using the average WTP before and after the 
revelation of information to the consumers on the specific characteristic that the good may 
present. Thus, using the relative price variation linked to the damage internalization is equal 
to the inverse demand shift defined by ,1, ) ( ,0, )] / ( ,0, )r p Q r p Q r δ− = , which leads to 
( ,0, )r p Q rδ= ×   (see Marette et al., 2008 for details). Under the absence of the standard 
(S=0), this value is internalized in the demand when consumers are aware (I=1) or used for 
the calculation of the cost of ignorance when consumers are unaware (I=0).  
Equilibrium 
Equilibrium is first presented for the situation where consumers are unaware of the damage 
when no regulation is implemented. Figure 1 shows domestic demand (D), foreign supply 
(SF) and total supply (SO+SF) (the domestic supply SO is omitted for clarity). The price, p, is 
located on the vertical axis and the quantity, Q, is shown along the horizontal axis.  
 Free trade without regulation leads to an equilibrium E. The equilibrium price Ep  
clears the market by equalizing demand and supply with an overall equilibrium quantity . 
 is foreign output and  is domestic output. The profits correspond to area Oxvp
E 
for foreign producers and area xvEz for domestic producers. The usual surplus of domestic 
consumers corresponds to area pEaE. The foreign products with the characteristic leading to 
the damage do not influence the demand since I=0. The corresponding cost of ignorance for 
domestic consumers is accounted for in the welfare calculations and is equal to  
represented by the area . Domestic welfare is the sum of domestic producers’ 
profits and consumer surplus minus the cost of ignorance. International welfare is the sum of 
EQ
E
FrQ
E
FQ
E
FQ Q−
0( ) EFr tQ−
E
 16 
 
domestic welfare and foreign producers’ profits.9 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
When a safety standard is adopted or enforced on foreign suppliers, the market 
allocation is modified as represented in figure 1 with the bold curves FS ,  D FS S+  and the 
equilibrium point H. Assuming that the stringent regulation increases cost of production of 
the foreign producers, supply is reduced relative to the initial equilibrium point v in figure 1. 
In other words, from the initial equilibrium quantity, the overall marginal costs increase by 
Epγ  for foreign producers. The supply shifts increases the equilibrium price to Hp , which 
reduces consumer surplus: pHaH <pEaE. For domestic consumers, the initial damage 
(represented by the area )) fully disappears once the standard is enforced. The 
overall effect of a stricter standard is ambiguous for consumers since it depends on the 
comparison between the surplus reduction and disappearance of the damage. The effect is 
also ambiguous for foreign producers since their production decreases for any given price, 
while the equilibrium price increases. The domestic producers have a higher profit wcHu > 
xvEz, since their supply curve did not change, while the price is higher. The overall 
comparison for different agents will be elicited in the next section, which introduces a simple 
application based on the mechanism depicted in figure 1. 
0( ) EFr tQ−
We now turn to the case where consumers are (or become) aware of the damage and 
internalize it. In this case, the baseline scenario (without standard) changes from the initial 
equilibrium E in figure 1 to initial equilibrium K in figure 2. Internalizing the damage 
decreases demand and baseline profits and the cost of ignorance disappears. The equilibrium 
price Kp  internalizes the damage in the demand. The enforcement of the standard in this case 
helps increase the demand, which leads to the new equilibrium H still in figure 2. Changes in 
                                                             
9 Full analytical expressions for equilibrium values as well as for all the components of welfare can be provided 
upon request. 
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profits and surplus stemming from the standard are different from those in figure 1. Foreign 
producers can gain from the standard as the equilibrium price increases when the equilibrium 
shifts from K to H. With aware consumers in the importing country it may be in the interest 
of foreign suppliers to have stricter standards enforced. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
 
4. Application with shrimp quality and trade frictions 
In this illustration, we simulate the impact of a safety standard eliminating the use of 
antibiotics in shrimp aquaculture, a widespread problem in many operations. Production and 
trade of shrimp products have seen a significant rise over the last decade globally and with 
dominant trade flows from emerging developing countries to OECD countries, especially the 
EU and the United States (Roheim, 2004). However, this expansion occurred at some health 
costs because the quality of seafood imports has been variable. The sanitary quality of 
seafood production in some developing countries has been subpart through the use of additive 
substances harmful to humans. To prevent and treat bacterial infections and other pathogens, 
shrimp producers use a range of pesticides, harmful drugs and antibiotics, which are toxic to 
human health. The illustration focuses on the EU-15. We measure the impact of a new 
stringent standard that could be adopted by the European Authorities and aiming at 
eliminating all antibiotic residues in shrimps.10 Testing technology has also evolved and the 
ability to detect ever smaller residues has been improved (Debaere, 2010). Note that the use 
of these antibiotics has been already banned inside the EU for many years. Therefore and 
consistent with the assumptions in our presented framework, the standard adopted by the 
European Authorities only affects non-European producers.   
With the initial situation preceding an enforcement of the regulation on foreign 
 
10 This standard could follow the organic process developed by Madagascar (Hervieu, 2009). 
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suppliers, parameters of the model are calibrated in such a way as to replicate market prices 
and quantities for the year 2006 in the EU-15 (corresponding to the equilibrium E in figures 1 
and 2). With the baseline scenario before the enforcement of the standard it is assumed that 
only foreign products use antibiotics. With the observed quantity  sold over a period, the 
average price  observed over the period, and the direct price elasticity 
ˆ
EQ
ˆ Ep ε  obtained from 
econometric estimates, the calibration leads to estimated values equal to  ˆ ˆ/E Eb Q pε= −1/ , 
 for a demand  ; the same method can be used for the supply side. 
Table 1 details the parameters used for calibrating the baseline scenario with I=0, namely 
when consumers are not aware of the antibiotic problem. 
 ˆ ˆEa bQ p= + E ( ) /Q a p= − b
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
The value of the per-unit damage associated with foreign shrimp, , defined in figure 
1, is determined by using results from a consumer choice experiment. This experiment was 
conducted in Paris, France, in multiple one-hour sessions in December 2009. The sample 
included 160 participants randomly selected based on the quota method. A multiple price list 
was used for eliciting consumers’ WTP for a 100g plastic package of farmed, midsize, 
shelled, cooked, and refrigerated shrimps. Cooked and refrigerated shrimps are the most 
common form of shrimp consumption in France. Participants were asked to choose whether 
or not they would buy the product for prices varying from €0.25 to €4 with a 25-cent interval 
between possible choices (Disdier and Marette, 2010a). Here, we use two of the WTPs 
elicited during this experiment: A first one before the revelation of any information and a 
second one after the revelation of information on food safety for shrimps produced in non-
European countries. These two WTP estimates allow measuring the marginal impact of 
information.  
r
Information about the willingness to pay for increased food safety was revealed 
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through responses to the following message:  
“Many bacteriological infections affect shrimp breeding pools. The bad 
production conditions (bad water quality for example) favor the growth of 
bacteria. To fight against these bacteria, shrimp producers in some 
developing countries use antibiotics and other chemical products that are 
toxic to human health and therefore forbidden in almost all countries. 
Given the difficulties and the cost of inspection of products, it is likely that 
some shrimps sold in France were treated with these antibiotics and 
chemical products toxic to human health.”   
The average WTP expressed by participants in the experiment, before the information 
revelation, is equal to €2.14 for tropical (foreign) shrimp, while the average WTP after the 
revelation is equal to €1.13. The relative variation of the WTP is therefore equal to (1.13-
2.14)/2.14= -0.47. This value is applied to the per-unit damage relative to the equilibrium 
price. Applying the price Ep  used for the initial calibration to the relative variation, the per-
unit damage is equal to  . Using this value, the cost of ignorance is  when 
I=0 (see figure 1) and the internalized per-unit damage is 
0.= 47 Er × p Ei Fr Q
/K Ki Fr Q Q  when I=1 (see figure 2).  
Eventually, the enforcement of the safety standard by the EU Authorities leads shrimp 
producers from developing countries to avoid antibiotics. The impact of avoiding antibiotics 
on the supply is determined as follows. Based on an analysis of organic shrimps in 
Madagascar, Hervieu (2009) notes that the switch from non-organic to organic shrimps 
increases the variable cost of production (farm price) from 5€/kg to 8€/kg. Organic 
production does not use antibiotics. Thus, we apply this change in variable unit cost to our 
model. The relative variation of the supply is equal to (8 5) / 5 0.6γ = − =  and is applied to the 
foreign supply curves presented in figures 1 and 2. Recall from figures 1 and 2 that only 
foreign products lead to the damage for consumers and only foreign producers are impacted 
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by the safety standard getting rid of the damage.  
Table 2 presents the variation in domestic consumers’ surplus (including the cost of 
ignorance linked to the damage for unaware consumers), the variation in domestic producers’ 
profits, the variation in foreign producers’ profits, and the relative variation in international 
welfare, which includes both domestic welfare and foreign producers’ profits following the 
enforcement of the safety standard. All of these measures refer to 2006. The first column 
corresponds to the market adjustment when consumers are unaware of the damage under the 
absence of standard as in figure 1. The second column corresponds to the market adjustment 
when consumers are aware of the damage (I=1) that would occur if the standard were absent 
(figure 1). 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
The results of table 2 show that, when the standard is implemented, foreign producers 
decrease their output and domestic producers increase their output (by taking the difference 
between the first line and the second line for each column), since domestic producers enjoy a 
better price without suffering the cost increase. Domestic consumers and domestic producers 
would benefit from a standard eliminating dangerous antibiotics. The variation in consumers’ 
surplus (including the cost of ignorance when I=0) is higher when consumers are initially 
unaware of the damage than when they are aware of the damage, since the cost of ignorance 
is eliminated by the safety standard with unaware consumers. The variation in consumers’ 
surplus is relatively low with aware consumers since the positive effect linked to the 
disappearance of the internalized damage is partially offset by the negative effect linked to 
the price increase.  
Foreign producers suffer from the standard only with unaware consumers (I=0) as 
described in figure 1, while they benefit from the standard if consumers are fully aware of the 
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antibiotics problem and of the solution in the form of a strict enforcement of the production 
standard at the border (I=1); in this case the increase in consumer demand leads to higher 
prices and profits even for foreign producers. With I=0, international welfare increases, but 
there are pronounced distribution effects as foreign producers lose profits. With I=1, the 
NTM should not be controversial since the safety standard benefits all foreign and domestic 
agents. For both cases (I=0 and I=1), the international welfare linked to the regulation 
increases, while the imports decrease (see the second line of table 2). It means that 
considering only trade volumes or values can be insufficient for characterizing an NTM.  
This application shows that the enforcement of a food safety standard can be socially 
preferable to the status-quo situation, both domestically and internationally. The size of the 
estimated damage that is avoided by enforcing stricter standards at the border is obviously 
crucial to this result. A second driver is the estimated cost of switching to alternative 
production methods, in this case antibiotics-free shrimp production. Alternatives must be 
available, and the additional cost must be low enough to provide incentives to foreign 
suppliers to switch production methods. Finally, the most beneficial policy package combines 
enforcement of the standard at the border with generating consumer awareness of the food 
safety issue.      
It should be kept in mind, though, that the numerical magnitudes of the estimated 
welfare effects presented here depend crucially on the underlying functional forms (linear 
demand and supply functions) and on the quality of data and parameters.  
 Many extensions to the relatively simple illustration discussed here can be considered. 
For instance, an export demand for the EU could be estimated and considered since the EU is 
a relatively large actor. Gravity results linked to the previous regulation enforcement could be 
also considered (Disdier and Marette, 2010b). A scenario with a label signaling the origin and 
a high level of safety could be studied (Bureau et al., 1998).  
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Non-prohibitive standards where both domestic and foreign firms make costly efforts 
to comply and consumers are to some extent able to identify the degree of compliance can 
easily be accommodated. Other extensions include entry and exit of firms in the face of fixed 
(through additional investments) and variable (through additional activities) compliance cost, 
If compliance with standards and regulations implies large investments that are sunk once 
undertaken, economies of scale become an important characteristic of the industry structure 
(Rau and van Tongeren, 2007, 2009; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). Sunk investments do not 
figure in the firms’ optimal pricing decisions and have more indirect effects on market prices 
through entry and exit of firms. Only firms that are sufficiently productive to “jump the 
hurdle” of fixed market entry costs will be able to export. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Efficiency implications of NTMs are much less evident than the welfare losses associated 
with tariffs and quota. NTMs do not necessarily embody the economic inefficiencies that are 
associated with classical trade barriers, unless they discriminate between sources of supply, 
and they may be the least trade-restricting policies available in the face of market 
imperfections. It is therefore not clear a priori that the trade impacts of regulations are 
inefficient, or that removal of associated NTMs that affect trade would achieve efficiency 
gains that would exceed the losses from weaker regulation.  
The increasing prevalence of NTMs is a permanent reality of trade in agri-food. A 
systematic assessment of their effects, across countries and products, is much warranted, in 
particular in view of the rising occurrence of trade frictions about food safety and food 
quality (Josling et al., 2004; Disdier and van Tongeren, 2010).  
This paper contributes to a systematic analysis of economic costs and benefits of 
NTMs, focusing on the often neglected aspect of consumer benefits from regulations that aim 
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at addressing market failures in the food sector. The proposed methodology is operational for 
comparing alternative policy choices like standards, border inspections policy and labeling in 
an international context. The methodology contributes to a more comprehensive welfare 
analysis of NTMs than that offered by looking at trade effects alone. 
The illustrative application to shrimp trade in the face of EU regulations aiming at 
eliminating consumption of shrimps that contain antibiotics shows that enforcement of such a 
production standard can be welfare enhancing, both domestically and internationally. The 
benefits are more widely shared between domestic and foreign players if domestic consumers 
are made fully aware of the particular health problem and the solutions in the form of a 
strictly imposed production standard. The clear policy message is that a well designed policy 
package combines enforcement of the standard at the border with generating consumer 
awareness of the food safety issue.      
The proposed comparative approach to NTMs allows for the identification of 
alternative ways to address a given regulatory problem. By systematically enumerating costs 
and benefits for all the different economic actors involved, an evidence-based approach can 
be followed that yields a solid basis for mutual exchange and identification of least-cost 
solutions.  
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Table 1. Values of parameters for the calibrated model of shrimps in 2006 
Variable European Union (EU-15) 
Domestic production sold on the domestic 
market (tons) 
 49,970 
Imports sold on the domestic market (tons) 473,196 
Consumption in 2006 (tons) 523,166 
Price per kg in 2006 (US $)ª  6.29 
Own-price elasticity of demandb  -0.67 
Own-price elasticity of supply (domestic 
and foreign)c 
0.97 
Note: quantities and prices in 2006 come from United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (2009).  
ª: The domestic price was estimated by dividing the average value of imports by the quantity of imports and 
exports in the EU (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 2009).  
b: Asche and Bjørndal (2001) for crustaceans in the European Union. 
c: Dey et al. (2004) for the aquaculture of shrimps by taking the average of own-price elasticities of 
demand over the top 5 world producers of shrimps in table 3 (p. 5).  
 30 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Welfare changes for the year 2006 linked to the safety standard enforced at the 
border 
European Union – 15 
 
 Unaware 
Consumers (I=0) 
Aware 
Consumers (I=1) 
Change in quantity consumed (tons) -87,966 
(-16.8%) 
166   
  (0.03%) 
Change in imports (tons) -100,131 
(-21.1%)  
- 20,415 
(-5.1%) 
Price change (US$ per kg) 1.57 
(25%) 
2.67 
(51%) 
Change in domestic consumers surplus 
(without the cost of ignorance) (US$) 
- 756,408,719 
(-71.5%) 
1,303,265 
(0.07%) 
Change in cost of ignorance with unaware 
consumers only (I=0) 
1,398,911,824 
(+100%) 
 
Change in domestic producers profits 
(US$) 
88,480,594 
(54%) 
138,469,958 
(123.6%) 
Change in domestic welfare (US$) 730,983,699 
(59%) 
139,773,223 
(7.7%) 
Change in foreign exporters profits (US$) - 8,430,689 
(-0.5%) 
464,948,019 
(43.8%) 
Change in international welfare (US$)   722,553,010 
(26.2%) 
604,721,242 
(21%) 
Note: relative changes (%) compared to the baseline scenario in parentheses. 
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Figure 1. Impact of a standard with unaware consumers (I=0) 
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Figure 2. Impact of a standard with aware consumers (I=1) 
 
